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Progress in Med ical Ethics:
How the Ethicist Can Help
Paul F. Comenisch, Ph.D.
In this article Dr. Camenisch
presents a plea for mutual understanding between ethicists and
medical professionals. He is Associate Professor of R eligious

Studies at DePaul University and
is a post-doctoral FellollJ at the

Texas Institute 0/ Religion.
There would be some justice or
at least symmetry in the companion piece to Dr. Lisson's article being authored by a physician. And in onc sense Charles B.
Moore has already done this. !
But there are also advantages to
critical reflections and gentle reprimands originating from within
the fraternity being addressed.
We ethicists, often with the very
best of intentions, sometimes create our own obstacles by our
mode of entry into medical areas
and by some of our unexamined
working assumptions. We a lso
often permit existing obstacles to
stand by, fai ling to clarify the
nature of the ethical task. Being
aware of these troublesome ele·
ments and exorcizing them where
possible should facilitate progress
in medical ethics, especiaJly at
those points where such progress
hinges on an adequate under·
standin g of the nature of ethics
or on good will between the medi ·
cal professionals and institutions
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(not just physicians) and the
professional ethicists.
Territoriality
The ethicist is often perceived
by the medlcal professional as an
invader, a usurper who seeks to
bring under his own aegis terri·
tory - problems, decisions, pre·
rogatives - which has un til now
belonged indisputably to the
medical profession. Thus resent·
ment and resistance are often
visited on the ethicist who seems
bent on upsetting the status quo
or at least on further disturbing
troubled waters by raising addi·
tional doubts in the minds of peo·
pie already uncertain about the
quality of current medical care,
the truly h uman benefits of cer·
t a i n technologically advanced
medical proced ures, t he justice of
having to spend so much money
in the attem pt to preserve their
life a nd health.
The first and most obvious way
to defuse some of this resentment
and resistance at being "invaded"
is for the ethicist to state as
clearly as possible that the ethical
issues being raised are not identical with questions of the personal ethics - honor, integrity,
etc. - of the medical professional. But this is not a simple issue,
a nd those ethicists who simply
toss off this distinction as a pan269

acea for all such unhappiness the
medica l professional feels have
simply missed the complexity of
this issue.
There is not space here to explore the various levels on which
the questions being raised in
medical ethics might relate to the
moral/ethical integrity and sensitivity of the medical professional. But most ethicists, being
teachers, can perhaps grasp something of what medical personnel
under ethical scrutiny feel if they
imagine themselves in an analogous situation. How would we respond to being accused of engaging in practices, of employing instructional methods, of participating in a system wh ich, in spite
of our own personal integrity, injure, even brutalize and dehumanize our students? (Many of
us, of course, were accused of precisely this by black groups several
years ago when they aUacked
the " institutionalized racism" of
much of formal education.) In
such a situat.ion it is some comfort, but not reall y enough, to be
told that one's personal morality
is not under attack. Such assurances declare us innocent of the
more obvious, the grosser violations. Bu t they still imply that we
have been party to other wrongs
which we were not perceplive
enough to detect. And that is no
compliment.
Here the I;!th icist can only try
to make sure tha t medical professionals do not read into his
analysis, his questions and suggestions, personal accusations
which need not be there and
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which most often serve only to
obscure the real issues when they
do become the focus of aUention.
A more significant response to
the medical profession's inclination to defend its "territory,"
however, is to suggest that so
long as ethicists are raising the
right issues, the territory which
would appear to be in dispute between the medical and the ethical professionals in fact belongs
to neither of them. The territory
---ethical questions about various
areas of medical practice such as
whether some medical procedures
should be used at all , whether
some medical research should go
forward, and if so, under what circumstances ,etc. - belongs either
to the patient/ subject involved
or to the public at large. [n the
first case, for example, the question of whether to elect radica l
and grossly disfiguring surgery to
combat cancer or to die probably
sooner but "intact" is the patient's question. not the doctor's
or the ethicist's. And the question
of whether proxy consent should
be invoked to permit non-therapeutic research on children is a
question of social policy requiring
a decision from society at large,
however difficult that is to obtain
or to interpret. (This last statement does not mean that moral ity
is a question of majority vote, but
on ly that neither doctor nor ethicist can relieve society of the responsibility to shape its own policy. its own moral character in
such matters.) Thus these matters do not constitute territory to
be awarded as a prize for excelLinacre Quarterly

lence in disputation to either
medical or philosophical doctor.
Both may and should make their
own contribution to the discussion to aid the patient or the public in arriving at an informed and
critical conclusion. But the questions, the territory itself, are not
theirs to dispose of between them.
At most the professions deal
with such matters as with a trust.
The medical profession does not
own the human goods it is designed to provide. These goods health, long life, and the scientific-technological a d van c e s
which are meant to contribute to
them-are not possessions which
the profession is free to dispense
or withhold at its own discretion. 2
These goods are public trusts
which are most extensively dealt
with by the medical profession
simply because it has been en trusted by society with what are
currently seen as the best means
for securing a nd maintaining
them.
When me d i c a J professionals
and institutions realize that these
goods are public trusts, then the
entrance of qualified and sensitive ethicists into the ethical discussions which those goods generate should be met not with resistance and resentment, but with
relief. To those aware of their
own fallibility (humanity?) it
should be an awesome thing to
hold life and death, health/
wholeness and their opposites in
one's hands. And if ethicists can
achieve the impartiality, the personal disinterestedness they aspire to, then their analysis, their
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probings, their suggested resolutions should be no more, and no
less, than a responsible attempt
to help the medical profession
bear this heavy load. For example, the ethicist discussing informed consent with research
physicians should not be defending some vested interest of his
own which must be mapped out
and protected against medical
personnel. He should rather be
offering the analyses, the insights
of ethics to the researchers as
possible aids in their struggle to
discover precisely what society
has entrusted them with in this
area and how it can be most responsibly dealt with.
Clearly the ethicist ca n not
stand in the physician's place
and decide when to operate, when
to resuscitate, or how to weigh
t he cost/ benefits of a particular
therapy. But serious ethical reflection does aim at reducing the
need at such points for medical
personnel to draw only on their
own past experience and their
own hurried reflections. If the
ethicist can lighten that burden,
it is not because of his own
moral/ethical superiori ty but because of the traditions of substantive values and commitments,
of critical analysis, and on rare
occasion the societal consensus
he can make available to help inform the decisions of the medical
professional. On t his construction
of the situat ion in medical ethics
the ethicist is seen not as an invader of medical territory but potentially as one embodiment of
society's willingness to help the
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medical professional bear the
ethical, decisional burdens attaching to the goods he has been
entrusted with. The mystery here
is why anyone bearing such burdens would shun any responsible
attempt to share and t hereby to
lighten that load.
The Nature of Ethics
Part of the physician's feeling
of being invaded by "aliens" derives no doubt from his correct
perception that ethicists are raising questions quite different in
kind from those the scientifically
trained physician ordinarily deals
with. There are severa l ways of
characterizing this difference but
here it need only be said that the
doctor's questions are usually sci entific on some significant level
- that is, they deal with empi ri cal data. are usually thought to
have objective answers that can
be arrived at by agreed upon
procedures, answers which can be
verified, which are the same for
all competent investigators, etc.
The ethicist's questions, on the
other hand, are "soHer" in several respects. They seem to be
answerable only on the basis of
personal or group preference and
taste, commitments and values,
all of which are beyond proof.
And since many practitioners still
see their fie ld on a strict ly scienti fi c model, they sometimes resent even having this sort of issue
in troduced into it. In some circles
such resentment is at i ts height
against theological or religious
ethicists who are seen not only
as raising inappropriate questions
but as offering insights and an272

swers which are also in appropriate. Such religious insights are
thought inappropriate because
they are perceived as deriving
from t he values and commitments
of a limited group - a particular
religious community - and as
resting on some esoteric base
such as revelation or church authority rather than on "reason."
There are several important
misconceptions in this response
to t he ethicist. First. ethicists do
not bring the ethical issues into
medicine they are already
there. Wherever situations require a decision between competing human goods, there are ethical choices being made. We might
refuse to recognize them as such
and pretend that they can be an·
swered on some "purely scientific" basis. But that is a dangerous illusion because it permits
us to keep submerged and unex·
amined the ethical grounds we
are operating on. The ethicist
simply makes the ethical issues
already present in medicine explicit as ethical issues and challenges the profession to confront
them directly and critically rath·
er than pretending that they are
not there.
Secondly. the ethicist should
make clear that while it is true
that ethical questions are quite
"unscientific," this is no grounds
for eschewin g ethics and tryi ng
to practice some sor t of "value·
free" medicine. ("Va lue-free"
medicine would at best be medi·
cine in which the values were permitted to remain implicit.) Rather, this realization that ethical
Linacre Quarterly

analyses and claims rest not on
some sort of factual or logical
proof, but ultimately on human
choice, commitment, on values
aflinned and goods pursued,
should be noted and highlighted
not as the death of ethics but as
a crucial insight into the nature
of ethics - and in fact in to much
of human li fe. The fact which
must be faced by medical professionals and all scientifically
trained experts who might be
tempted to take retuge behind
their expertise is that they have
been and will be makin g this kind
of choice on this kind of ground,
and that such choices - at least
where they impin ge on t he wellbeing of others - must now be
made the subject of public discussion.
Finally, if the above assertions
about the nature of ethics and the
grounds of ethical decision making are correct, then theological
ethicists must boldly respond to
those who accuse us of speaking
from a limited base of commitments and convictions while other
ethicists presumably speak from
some broader, even universal
base. We must insist that all normative ethics finall y rest on conviction, that every et hic is a " believers' ethic." That is, that ul timately it speaks only for and to
those who share its convictional
base. Religious ethics is unique
here only in that it publicly proclaims its base. Other ethicis ts, in
making no such public declarations, create the illusion of having
nothing to declare. But that is
an illusion and should be exposed
November, 1976

as such.
Thus t he question is not
whether ethical decisions will be
made in medicine, but whether
they will be faced as ethical and
confronted openly and critically.
And if the latter question is answered affirmatively, the next
question is not whether we will
respond to them on the basis of
some specific group's convictions
and values, but rather which
groups and/ or individuals will be
permitted to offer their commitments and values as possible
starting points for ethical deliberation. Open acknowledgmen t
and careful elaboration of these
points about the nature of all
ethical reflection will aid progress
in medical ethics by making clear
the sort of task we are engaged in.
Constituency
All too often ethicists seem to
cast themselves in the role of defender of the public interest
against the harm done by selfseeking and/ or morally insensitive and/ or et hicall y inept
medical professionals. While this
assigning of roles is often only
tacit , the medical partners in the
discussion are alert to it and are
rightfully resentful of the various
ways in which it shapes the discussion. Such an assigning of roles
is unfair and inaccurate on several counts. First, the ethicist
rarely succeeds in being a personally disinterested, entirely
"objective" champion of the public good. We too have our vested
interests. Ours are perhaps less
obvious and are surely less rewarding financiall y than those
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the medical professionals are often accused of; but t hey are
equally capa ble of distorting our
analysis and our arguments. Who
among us would not like to be
acclaimed as a giant-killer, or at
least as a fu ll professor on the
basis of having tweaked the
giant's beard? And what more
lik ely candidate is t here for the
role of Goliath today than the
medical network?
Secondly, this assigning of roles
is unfa ir since the medical professional is seldom as devoid of
t he worthier motivations - compassion, a sense of public service,
etc. - as t he critic often suggests
he or she is. This is so obvious
t hat it needs no elaboration here.
But perhaps the most significant misrepresentation in this
view of the ethicis t's role is t he
assumption tha t he speaks for t he
public. On the basis of the presumed pu ri ty of our motives and
the intensity of our dedication to
defending the public good, we often declaim and exhort as though
we were the officially appointed
spokesmen for the voiceless
masses - as though they themselves had sent us in to t he fray
as their last, best hope. But clearly we have no such constituency.
We have received no such mandate, no such vote of confidence.
We do not speak for the masses
except in the limited sense of urging courses of action which we
see as serving their best interests.
Thus it is presumptuous of us to
conduct ourselves in ways which
seem to say to the medical fie ld,
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"We have come to speak fo r those
you serve but whom you do not
hear - they have sent us - we
speak with their voice!" When
either ethical or medical professionals assume this role, they
engage in an unbecoming paternalism which is a discredit to
t hemselves and a disservice to
the public.
Strategically it is unwise of
ethicists even to raise this question of the constituency we speak
for since the medical professiona l
can easily pu t us to shame on this
count. The publ ic at least knows
who the medical professionals a re
and what they do. And in the
continuing insistent demand for
their services the public continues
to give them something very like
a vote of confidence. It may be a
grudging vote qual ified by concern over the cos t and qual ity of
care, and even by the ill -defined
wish that some alternative were
available. But so long as the overwhelming majority of the people
turn to medica l professio nals in
their search for health, long life
a nd deliverance from suffering,
the medical network has an impressive constituency for which it
can in some limi ted ca pacity
speak. Thus ethicists must not
draw ba ttlelines which pu t themselves and the public on one side
and the medical professionals and
institut ions on the other.
The temptation which lies in
wait here fo r t he ethicist is a subt le but dangerous one. I recently
attempted to survey t he physician examining and licensing
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boards in the country's fifty-one
jurisdictions concerning t he ethical dimensions and implications
of physician licensing. At my last
coun t only sixteen of them had
responded. I was originally indignant at the a rrogance of these
boards to which the public has
entrusted such grea t res ponsibility and gran ted such great
privilege in denyin g to the public
insight into how they perceive
and carry out their public t rust.
The falla cy here, of course, is
that in request ing such information I was in no real sense actin g
as a representa tive of the public.
Denyin g the reques ted informa tion a nd in terpreta tions to me
could not simply be equated with
denying it to the public. And in
pre tending that it could I wa ..
assuming an office to which I had
no legitimate claim. I a m still inclined to be indi gnant over the
mat.ter. And on the basis of some
of the boards' past records I suspect that some arrogance was at
work along with other morc legiti mate and practical reasons for
not responding to the questionnaire. Bu t any such indignation 1
feel cannot be predica ted on a n
affron t to the public which did not
in fact. occur. If there is a rrogance
in the boards' denial of the informati on, nothin g is t.o be ga ined
by matching it wi th my own arroga nce. The boards have no right
to withhold such informa tion
from the public when it has been
duly requested. But I have not.
been commissioned by the publ k
~o to request it.
November, 1976

Expectations
I have already suggested that
the ethicist ca n be too much resis ted and resented. But it is also
possible on the basis of exaggerated expectations for him to be
too much welcomed. Some morally concerned physicians apparently feel they have been deserted
by the public to bear their burdens alone. In conversations with
such persons I have sometimes
had the disq uieti ng feeling tha t
they expected more than I could
in good conscience deliver, that
they hoped for a nswers which
would once nnd for all set their
minds at ease. Of course some
ethical traditions do provide just
such clear a nd una mbiguous an swers. One of the most familiar
examples here is the official Roman Cathol ic teaching on ma t ters
such as direct abort ion and mercy
killing. Ethicists workin g out of
such traditions shou ld offer such
anwers with conviction and without apology. And those of us who
do not s tand in such t rad ition"
shou ld know them well enough to
insure them a fair a nd informed
hearing from l-Iympathizer and
critic alike. But the fact is that
for reasons too numerous and too
complex to explore here most
ethicists do not feel that they
can provide "answers" in this
sense. They rather approach the
questions 'of medical ethics as
fellow-seekers with the medical
professional , offering tools which
they hope will help in their common pursuit of resolutions to inf;o lubl e human dilemmas. But
they do not come wi th catalogues
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of ready answers. For those of us
operating from this perspective
we must first see that we do not
ourselves cultivate any such un·
realistic expectations. Secondly
we must take note of them where
they do exist and firmly disclaim
them. Being publicly referred to
as an "expert in ethics" is so
unnerving precisely because it
bespeaks such an "answer man"
understanding of what we are
about.
Competing Goods
In the heat of moral debate it
is salutary to keep in mind that
in virtually all ethical dilemmas
there are competing goods all of
which we cannot sim ultaneously
maximize. (That, in one import·
ant sense, is what makes it an
ethical dilemma.) Conseq uently
we must choose which among
these competing goods or values
will be given priorit y. In addition
_ and here is the crux of the
matter - we must remember
that this choice is one about
which persons of good will may
in conscience disagree. For example, the resea rch physician
who chooses the future benefits
wh ich may result from non·thera·
peutic research on a child over
the absolute inviolability of his
her privacy, bodily integrity, etc.,
is not thereby revea led to be a
ghoul choosing the dark est of
evils over a self-evidently over·
whelming good. The physician
has chosen one good from among
the various goods available. Not
all of us will agree with that
choice. But we should at least be
able to see how that choice makes
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sense in the world the doctor
sees. Any opposition to it must
therefore reflect the respect we
should always feel in the presence
of a conscientiously choosing
moral agent. Of course, we might
in this case feel that t his choice
favors the most immediate, the
most empiricnl and possibly the
most superficial of the competing
goods. But it is nevertheless a
good chosen and not an evil em·
braced, and the choice and the
chooser should not be morally
disqualified or excoriated because
it is a choice we happen nol to
agree with.
It is particularly distressing
when ethicists let a single and
often rather limited moral issue
disproportionately s h a p e their
response to medical professionals
and ignore the fact that many
such proressionals appropriately
perceive their entire professional
identity and involvement as a
moral undertaking. To ignore this
latter much larger moral reality
because the med ica l professional
is not alert to the latest " hot" issue in medical ethics is a serious
injustice. For example, it is distressing on one level to see medi·
cal professionals SO vcry disturbed
over malpractice insurance costs
(especially when it is not accom·
panied by equal concern over
sky·rocl{eting patien ts' medical
costs), and in some insta nces to
see their practice of medicine so
significantly guided by their de·
sire to avoid malpractice suits.
This is dis turbing primarily be·
cause such facts suggest that the
medical professional has traded
Linacre Quarterly

in the traditional professional
dedication to serving the public
for the less edifying selF-serving
quest for economic gain. But we
must also recognize that such
concern might reflect the professionals' awareness that the malpractice issue is threatening seriously to disrupt the only system
we currently have by which they
can deliver to the public essential
services they feel morally comIDitted t.o making available. The
malpractice situation is therefore
seen as a threat to their ability to
make good their entire professional-moral comm itment . Admittedly this interpretation of
the profession's response to the
malpractice situation is too idealistic to fit with the public's current assessment of the medical
network as a whole. But this fact
alone gives us no real grounds for
dismissing it, and therefore no
grounds for ignoring it and similar more inclusive moral commitments in any fai r response to the
medical profession.
Origins of the Present Situation
It is not always flattering to be
in the spotlight. The maintenance
of good will with medica l personnel and institutions requires that
we keep clearly in mind the various influences which have put
medicine in the ethical spotlight.
Tn most cases it is reasonable to
assume that a Cocus on the ethics
of a group or field follows a general agreement that those ethics
have fallen to a conspicuously low
level. The widespread but apparently short-lived concern with the
et hics of politicians and attorneys
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immediately following Watergate
would conform to this pattern.
But such an assumpt ion would
not be fair in the case of medical
ethics. The amount of attention
being given medicaJ ethics currently is disproportionate on several counts. It does not reflect an
alarming disintegration of ethics
and morals in medicine either in
some absolute sense or in comparison to other professional!
occupational groups. Nor is it
proportional to the amoun t of
harm the public suffers at the
hands of medical personnel and
institutions which the ethicist
wants to reduce through his involvement there. Surely other
sectors of society such as the economic, the legal and the poli tical
inflict as much harm on the public as does t.he medical.
Medical ethics has attained the
prominence it has not primarily
for any such negative reasons
which would reflect discredit on
the medical profession , but rather because of the coincidence of
a variety of positive influences.
Most. obvious among these are the
impressive scientific-technological
advances made in medicine in t.he
last two decades which presented
vast new possibilities for doing
both good and harm. These possibilities frequently arose in ethically uncharted waters and therefore pressed the medical professionals themselves, as well as the
public and t he ethicists, to subject them to careful mora l examination.
A second major influence was
the willingness of various sources,
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mostly private, to fund investigation into medical ethical issues.
This willingness arose in part
from the developments just mentioned, but also in part from a
continuing concern about medical
issues of longer standing. And finaliy, medical ethics has prospered because of the willingness
of many within the medical professions and institutions to enter
into discussions, to host conferences, and in other ways to foster
and participate in such inquiry.
Thus it behooves all of us to remember tha t while being in the
spotlight is not always a flattering or pleasant experience, the
simple fact that medical ethics is
currently there is in itself no negative comment on the moralf
ethical state of the medical field .
We should also be aware of the
almost universa l tendency to blow
out of proportion those instances
of moral failin g - greed, deception, self-seeking - we sometimes find among medical professionals and institutions. This is
an understandable reaction to
such shortcomings in a professional group when the aspirations
and claims of that group and the
public's expecta tions of it are so
high. Such wide disparity between the idea l sought and the
actual perfonnance observed does
perhaps warrant some indignation. But such a response should
not blind us to the fact that such
failings seldom fall below what is
publicl y admitted to by, and even
expected of, most other gainfully
employed persons in the economy. An ambitious power-seeking,
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money-and-status-pursuing vicepresident of General Motors is no
cause for public scandal. A doctor operating on similar criteria is
more disconcerting, but is ground
neither for condemning the profession as a whole nor for reading
the individual involved out of the
human race.
Remembering Who We Are
One last suggestion aims as
much at benefitting the e thicist
himself as at cultivating good will
between him and the medical professional. It might, however, contribute to this latter goal as well
by making clear what kinds of
credentials can rightly be reo
quired of the medical ethicist. As
I understand ethics and thereafter medical ethics, an ethicist
working in medical issues whatever title he carries - must
be an ethicist before he can he a
medical ethicist. And the former
remains his prior, his more basic
identity even after he has become a "medica l" ethicist.
Whether we "do" our ethics out
of theological, philosophical, behavioral scientific or some other
starting poin ts, our identity as
ethicists is a necessary prerequi.
site to doing medical ethics.
This conviction has severa l
grounds and several implications.
The implications are of more interest here. Fi rst, it means that
however deeply we get involved in
medical ethics we cannot afford
to let our roots in critical ethics,
wherever they are sunk , wither
and die. If that happens we have
nothing to offer in the medica l
or any other area but intuitive
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ad hoc s uggestions. Secondly, it

means that we need not be medical experts in order to do medical
ethics. We need not "read all the
literature." The medical people
with whom we converse must
keep up with their lield. And we
need to be " up" enough to be able
to join in their conversation without brin ging it to a dead halt by
continual requests for elementary
information. But unless we have
paraded ourselves as medical experts we have no need to be such
in order to do medical ethics. The
feelin g that we must be informed
on every breaking medical story
rests on the assumptions that every medical advance raises new
ethical problems, and that only
we ca n solve those problems.
Both assumptions are false. Most
medical advances offer new occasions for bringing to bea r long
established values. commitments
or principles, but seldom do they
raise totally new issues. Heart
transplants, while radically new
technically, were humanly and
morally s UII about the value of
life, respect for life, respect for
the dying, etc., values which have
helped shape moral reflection for
millenia. The second assumption
is also fal se. We need not, in fact
we cannot without preempting
the moral agency of the medical
personnel and the patient/ suhjects involved, make the applications of the principles or values
in every case. Such a pplications
lie in the realm of prudence, a
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virtue which every agent must exercise for himself. We ca nnot assume that when we as professional
ethicists are not on the "cutting
edge" of medical advances, there
is no one there to deal with the
ethical implications.
The above items, kept firmly in
mind and said aloud when others
overlook them, can contribute to
progress in medical ethics. Where
the above seems too harsh on
ethicists it should be taken as a
personal confession of this ethicist and not as a rebuke aimed
at medical ethicists in general.
Where it seems too gent le on the
medical professionals and institutions it should be taken no t as a
rejection of needed critical and
sometimes divisive moral analysis
of the difficult problems in medical practice, but as a plea for
mutual understanding between
ethicists and medical professionals as well-intentioned fellow
seekers of the good. I t is hoped
that such an understanding will
make it possible for ethical debate to center on the crucial
substantive issues facing us in
medicine rather than on the personal failings of which we all have
our share.
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